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I. Statement of the Case
At issue is whether a governmental entity that submits inaccurate corporate filings
with the Idaho Secretary of State that misled a litigant can avoid suit by asserting plaintiffs'
failure to fulfill procedural processes contained in the Idaho Tort Claim Act ("ITCA").
Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. was a registered Idaho not for profit
corporation in good-standing at the time this suit was filed. 1 It was incorporated on
November 16, 2009. 2

In May 2015, Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. filed standard

form documents with the Idaho Secretary of State informing the public Valor Health was its
assumed business name. 3 Valor Health is the only name on any medical record, bill or
communication plaintiffs received related to Mr. Hollingsworth's negligent care at issue in
the case. 4 Plaintiffs relied on the official business record filing in pursuing the litigation. 5
Plaintiffs pursued the case against defendant as an Idaho not for profit membership
corporation not subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
Defendants assert that, despite the corporate filings, Valor Health is actually Walter
Knox Memorial Hospital--a county owned and operated entity. 6 Defendants proclaim
Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc as only "on paper as a corporation" with no other

R. p. 204, ,r 3 and pp. 210-13.
Id.
3
R. p. 204,, 4 and p. 215
4
R. p. 206,, 12 and pp. 241-53.
5
R. p. 205, ,r 10.
6
R. p. 43, ,r 2, p.134, ,r 2, p. 191, ,r 2.
1

2
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existence. 7 Defendant claims and the trial court in granting summary adjudication
concluded that, regardless of the official filings, Valor Health is a county hospital and
plaintiffs' claim is barred because of their failure to precisely fulfill a claimant's notice
obligations under the ITCA.

II.
A.

Issues on Appeal

Does the ITCA shield from liability a governmental entity that has submitted
misleading filings with the Secretary of State?

B.

Is the legal remedy ofldaho Code§ 30-21-211 sufficient on the facts of the
case or should equitable remedies be applied?

C.

Is Foster v. Kootenai Med. Center, 142 Idaho 425, 146 P.3d 691 (App. 2006)
valid Idaho law?

III.

The Factual Background of the Case -- Medical Care, Hospital
Corporate Status and History of Proceedings.
A. Defendants Negligently Caused Rockne Hollingsworth a Substantial
Injury. 8
Rockne Hollingsworth was admitted to the Valor Health emergency room on

September 29, 2017. Dr. Harold K. Thompson, M.D., a Valor Health employee9 , was Mr.

7
8
9

R. p. 191, ,r 6.
R. pp.259-262.
R. p. 128, ,r 2.
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Hollingsworth's treating physician. Mr. Hollingsworth presented with complaints of
persistent chest pain. Testing unequivocally showed an acute anterior wall myocardial
infarction. Rather than transfer him for further care, Dr. Thompson told Mr. Hollingsworth
his workup was "unremarkable for acute coronary syndrome ... or other acute
cardiac ... etiologies" and discharged him.
After a few days of ongoing problems, Mr. Hollingsworth returned and was
transported emergently to St. Alphonsus. There, Dr. Stephen Fonken concluded that Mr.
Hollingsworth's presentation was "consistent with development of congestive heart failure,
most likely due to delayed evaluation for what appears to have been an acute anterior wall
myocardial infarction sustained more than a week ago." After filing and getting a positive
decision in the pre-litigation screening process, Mr. Hollingsworth brought this suit asserting
that Dr. Thompson breached the standard of care leading to his life-changing congestive
heart failure.
B.
Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. is an Idaho Not For Profit
Corporation d/b/a Valor Health.
It is undisputed that all services in this case were provided to Mr. Hollingsworth by
Valor Health. 10 At the time suit was filed, Valor Health was on record at the office of the
Idaho Secretary of State as an assumed name of the not for profit corporate entity Walter
Knox Community Hospital, Inc. 11

10
11

R. p. 206, ~ 13 and pp. 241-53.
R.p.215.
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Walter Knox Memorial Hospital was formed following a bond election in 1961. 12 The
Secretary of State records establish that Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. is a distinct
legal entity that came into existence on November 16, 2009. As part of this litigation,
defendants have submitted that Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. was formed for
revenue raising reasons. 13 There was an intent, apparently never realized, to lease equipment
from the Memorial Hospital to the corporation. 14
Defendants have never explained why Valor Health is identified with the Secretary of
State as a d/b/a of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. The district court never directly
addressed the impact of that filing. It merely reasoned that, despite unrefuted expert
testimony to the contrary, plaintiffs somehow lacked diligence in ascertaining the filing was
false. 15
Rockne Hollingsworth' s medical records identify his care as being provided by Valor
Health. 16 For example, as is shown in the record at page 247:

12
13
14
15
16

R. pp. 139-147.
R. p. 191 ,r,r 3-4.
R.p.19I,,r4.
R. pp., 302-05.
R. p. 206, ,r,r.13, 14 and pp. 241-53.
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At no point in any record is Valor Health identified as being part of Gem County.
Likewise, Rockne Hollingsworth's medical bills all identify the billing entity as Valor
Health. 17 For example as is shown in the record at page 251:

I I I I ILI I I I
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Nowhere on any bill he received is Gem County identified.
Mr. Hollingsworth's care at issue in this case was provided by Dr. Harold K.
Thompson, MD who defendants admit was, and is, an employee of Valor Health. 18 When

17
18

See id.
R. p. 128.
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counsel went to investigate Valor Health, the records of the Secretary of State revealed it to
be the assumed business name of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc.
There is more. Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. actively and repeatedly acted
to maintain its corporate status between 2009 and 2018. 19

Among other things shown in the

filings with the Secretary of State are that Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. changed
its registered agent from Max Long to John Olson to Wade Johnson to Brad Turpen.
Moreover, its separate and distinct corporate existence was reaffirmed in 2016 when, after
having been administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State, it applied for reinstatement.
It filed its annual reports with the Secretary of State from 2009 to 2017 except in 2015 which
failure led to its administrative dissolution.
The misleading nature of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. 's corporate flings
are brought into even clearer focus when one looks at how other county hospitals act. The
vast majority of other county hospitals file nothing with the Secretary of State. This itself
indicates governmental status or at a minimum prompts a potential litigant to engage in
further research. 20

Teton Valley Hospital is another type of example. Teton County filed a

d/b/a with the Secretary of State identifying "Teton Valley Hospital" as a d/b/a of Teton
County. 21 Similarly, Lemhi County has identified Steele Memorial Medical Center as an

R. p. 204-205, 113-7 and p. 210-227.
R. p. 206, 1 12.
21
R. p. 206, 1 12 and p. 240.
19

20
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assumed business name it uses. 22 IN fact, during the course of this case Gem COUnty has
rectified the problem it caused with its filings and on December 23, 2019, Valor Health
submitted a new filing with the Secretary of State now identifying it as a d/b/a/ of Gem
County. 23
C.
Defendants were Provided Actual Notice of Mr. Hollingsworth's
Claim Before any ITCA Deadlines had Passed.
The course of proceedings following the negligent care shows the Hollingsworths'
timely pursuit of their claim. It cannot be denied that all interested parties were on notice and
knew to initiate any needed investigation, preserve any relevant evidence, prepare a defense
if any and even make an effort to reach an amicable solution if they felt it appropriate.

Timeline of Relevant Events 24
Date
9/29/2017
10/5/2017
11/3/2017
12/1/2017
12/8/2017
2/20/2018
2/27/2018
3/7/2018
3/14/20 18

22
23

24

Event
Negligent Medical Care Provided
Negligent Care Identified
Plaintiffs Counsel Requests Records From Valor Health
Plaintiffs Counsel Submits 2nd Request For Records To Valor
Health Because Of No Response
Records Provided To Plaintiffs Counsel By Valor Health
Prelitigation Screening Request Filed After Professional Review
Identifying and Confirming Malpractice
Service of Prelitigation Screening on Brad Turpen Registered
Agent For, and CEO of, Valor Health
Letter From Nicole Cannon Identifying Herself As Counsel For
Valor Health
Pre litigation Hearing Date Set For May 7, 20 18

R. p. 238 .
Attached hereto as Addendum A.
R. p. 207, 1 15. ( referenced chart reproduced).
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3/21/2018
3/28/2018

Valor Health Records Provided to Defendant's Counsel Nicole
Cannon
180 Days After Provision of Negligent Care-Tort Claim Deadline

5/7/2018

Valor Health Records Provided to Pre-Litigation Screening
Panelists
Prelitigation Hearing

5/14/2008

Prelitigation Panel Decision

8/14/2018

Complaint Filed

Early Sept. 2018

2/13/2019

Telephone Conversation Between Charles Hepworth and Nicole
Cannon Regarding Potential For Acceptance of Service
Follow-up telephone call message left by John Janis Regarding
Potential For Acceptance Of Service
John Janis Informed by Nicole Cannon that Valor Health NOW
Claimed Governmental Entity Status
Acceptance of Service And Notice of Appearance Filed by Nicole
Cannon for Defendants
Stipulation For Scheduling and Planning Reached

4/16/2019

Motion to Dismiss Filed

4/23/2019

Amended Complaint Correcting Misnomer in Caption Filed

5/5/2019

Motion To Dismiss Withdrawn

5/21/2019

Motion For Summary Judgment Filed

4/26/2018

Early Oct. 2018
10/12/2018
11/1/2018
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IV.

Standard of Review.

When reviewing an appeal from a granted summary judgment this Court uses the
same standard as the district court does in ruling upon the motion. See, e.g., Cobbley v. City
of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 156, 59 P.3d 959, 961 (2002) (citing Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho

166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The well-established standard is that summary judgment
is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery documents
before the Court indicate that ( 1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and (2)
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); Elliott
v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281,286,385 P.3d 459,464 (2016); see also Swaffordv. Huntsman
Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209,409 P.3d 789, 792 (2017) (quoting Chandler v. Hayden, 147

Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d 485,488 (2009)) ("Summary judgment is proper when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the only remaining questions are questions of law.").
Under the applicable standard all "disputed facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142
Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006); see also Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 685, 365 P.3d 1033, 1039

(2016) ("the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences,
in favor of the nonmoving party."). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 14

issue of material fact rests at all times with the party moving for or defending a granted
summary judgment. See Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 (2007).

V.

Idaho Tort Claims Act Notice Requirements Are Properly
Construed To Effect Justice.
The ITCA serves to abrogate sovereign immunity. See Van v. Portneuf Medical

Center, 147 Idaho 552, 557, 2 12 P.3d 982, 987 (2009). Thus, it is solely applicable to the
State, political subdivisions and employees as defined in Idaho Code § 6-902. In applying
the ITCA this Court has acknowledged that it must consider and employ the guidance of
Idaho Code§ 73-102 which directs "'[t]he compiled laws establish the law of this state
respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under
them are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect their objects and to promote
justice."' Cnw, LLC v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 161 Idaho 89,383 P.3d 1259 (2016). And,
therefore " [t]o avoid thwarting meritorious claims on nonmeritorious, technical grounds" the
Court has "consistently taken 'a liberal approach to interpreting the notice requirement of the
ITCA.' Id., (quoting Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,474, 716 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1986)

(quoting Farber v. State ofIdaho, 102 Idaho 401,402,630 P.2d 688, 689).)
That liberal approach to notice is consistent with the genesis of the statute. In Smith

v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 801, 473 P.2d 937,943 (1970) the Idaho Supreme Court because of
the "established trend discrediting the doctrine of sovereign immunity" abrogated the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in the State of Idaho. In response, the Idaho legislature

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 15

adopted the Idaho Tort Claims Act in 1971. See 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws 743 Ch. 150.
Among its original provisions the ITCA contained a notice requirement the current version
of which is in Idaho Code § 6-906. That section now provides:
All claims against a political subdivision arising under the provisions of
this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision for
any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope of his
employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary
of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty ( 180) days from
the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered,
whichever is later.
This Court's early decisions under the ITCA noted the primary function of such
notice is to "put the governmental entity on notice that a claim against it is being prosecuted
and thus apprise it of the need to preserve evidence and perhaps prepare a defense." Smith v.

City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618,621,586 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1978). Later cases have included
purported purposes of the notice requirement to "'(l) save needless expense and litigation by
providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow
authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine
the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses."' Friel v.

Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 486, 887 P.2d 29, 31 (1994) (quoting Pounds v.
Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991)). This Court has held that the
notice requirement time line commences when a person is aware of facts that would cause a
reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the incident
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whether the government's role is known at the time. See Mitchell v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp.,
130 Idaho 420, 423, 942 P.2d 544, 547 (1997).
Somewhat contrasting with its obligation to employ the guidance of Idaho Code § 73102, the Court has ruled "[c]ompliance with the Idaho Torts Claims Act's notice requirement
is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no
matter how legitimate" Mitchell v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420,423, 942 P.2d 544,
54 7 ( 1997). Generally, to pursue a tort action against a governmental entity in Idaho,
plaintiffs must first notify the entity of the claim within 180 days of when they knew or
reasonably should have known of the injury.
The question not previously addressed by this Court is that where a governmental
entity takes affirmative steps that result in a claimant reasonably concluding that the ITCA
does not apply, can the entity take refuge in the notice provision of Idaho Code § 6-906.

VI.

Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. Has No Claim to
Protections of the Tort Claims Act.
Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. is not a governmental entity within the scope

of the ITCA. It is an Idaho not for profit corporation organized under the laws of Idaho
governed by its members and a Board of Directors elected by its members. 25 The only
entities that can take advantage of the ITCA are those identified in § 6-902 of the statute.
The relevant portions provide:

25

R.p.211.
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1. "State" means the state of Idaho or any office, department, agency,
authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university
or other instrumentality thereof.
2. "Political subdivision" means any county, city, municipal
corporation, health district, school district, irrigation district, an
operating agent of irrigation districts whose board consists of directors
of its member districts, special improvement or taxing district, or any
other political subdivision or public corporation. As used in this act, the
terms "county" and "city" also mean state licensed hospitals and
attached nursing homes established by counties pursuant to chapter 36,
title 31, Idaho Code, or jointly by cities and counties pursuant to
chapter 3 7, title 3 1, Idaho Code.
3. "Governmental entity" means and includes the state and political
subdivisions as herein defined.
4. "Employee" means an officer, board member, commissioner,
executive, employee, or servant of a governmental entity, including
elected or appointed officials, and persons acting on behalf of the
governmental entity in any official capacity, temporarily or
permanently in the service of the governmental entity, whether with or
without compensation, but the term employee shall not mean a person
or other legal entity while acting in the capacity of an independent
contractor under contract to the governmental entity to which this act
applies in the event of a claim.
The only potential basis under which Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. could
possibly claim protection under the statute is as a "public corporation" under Idaho law.
There is no generalized definition of public corporation in Idaho law. 26
However, Idaho's Attorney General has identified that the test for assessing whether
something is a public corporation is "whether the government has the sole right to regulate,

26

Though not relevant to this appeal it is troublesome that one definition of public corporation in Idaho law is "a
corporation that has a class of equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 or is subject to section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934." See Idaho Code§ 36-1601 (12), (14).
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control and direct the corporation." Idaho Atty. Gen. OP 1993-G-0706 (citing Idaho Atty.
Gen. Op. 89-7 at 8 (1989) (citing Trustees of Columbia Academy v. Board of Trustees, 262 S.
Ct. 117,202 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1974))). Similarly, this Court has noted in addition "an
essential element of a municipal or public corporation is a corporate purpose deemed to be
for the welfare of the general public- ' a public corporation is one that is created for political
purposes with political powers to be exercised for purposes connected with the public good
in the administration of civil government."' Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irr. Dist., 97
Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80, (1976) (quoting Fletcher, Cyc Corp§ 58 p. 292 (Perm. ed. 1974))
(holding an irrigation district cannot assert ITCA protections).
Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. is not under the sole control of the
government. Its articles of incorporation make clear that it is controlled by its Members
which "shall consist of a broad representation of the citizens of Gem County. ,m They have
the authority to "vote on any matter. 28 " And the corporation is "managed by its Board of
Directors" ... who "shall be elected by the Members." 29 Similarly, a not for profit
corporation organized "to pursue charitable, religious, educational or scientific purposes
within the meaning of Section 501 (c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code" 30 as was Walter
Knox Community Hospital, Inc, cannot be considered one exercising "political powers."

27

R. p. 211.

2s Id.
29
30

Id.
R.p.210
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The ITCA does not apply to Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Valor
Health because the Defendant is not subject to the provisions of the statute. On that basis
alone, the summary judgment in this case was improperly granted.

VII.

Idaho Law Makes Available Both Legal and Equitable Remedies
To A Party Damaged by Inaccurate Business Filings.
That Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc is not subject to the provisions of the

ITCA creates other issues within the case. The multiple corporate filings, the affidavits
attempting to explain the providence of those filings, the use of Valor Health as its operating
name, all lead to reasonable confusion of who is the proper defendant. What defendants
claim Valor Health is and what the record shows it is are two different things. It is a
conundrum created by defendants' filings. Idaho law does not allow a defendant to profit
from such a conundrum or use it to escape liability for which they are culpable.
A. Idaho Law Requires Filings with the Secretary of State to be Accurate.
The record of the Secretary of State unequivocally establishes that Valor Health was a
d/b/a of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. when services were provided and at the time
suit was filed. Idaho law establishes that it is reasonable and appropriate for litigants to rely
and act on filings with the Secretary of State. Idaho Code § 30-21-209 requires that any filing
with the Secretary be true. It provides in part:
SIGNING OF ENTITY FILING. (a) Signing an entity filing is an
affirmation under the penalties of perjury that the facts stated in the
filing are true in all material respects.
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(b) A record filed under this act may be signed by an agent.
If an inaccurate filing is made, the law allows corrections. But it also expressly
provides that a party that relied on the inaccurate information can not suffer a detriment
because of that reliance. That part of the statutory schem~ provides:
Idaho Code§ 30-21-205. CORRECTING FILED RECORD. (a) A
person on whose behalf a filed record was delivered to the secretary of
state for filing may correct the record if:
(1) The record at the time of filing was inaccurate;
.

' ..

(b) To correct a filed record, a person on whose behalf the record was
delivered to the secretary of state must deliver to the secretary of state
for filing a statement of correction.

( d) A statement of correction is effective as of the effective date of the
filed record that it corrects except as to persons relying on the
uncorrected filed record and adversely affected by the correction. As to
those persons, the statement of correction is effective when filed.
The chapter goes on to provide an express legal remedy for filings that are inaccurate.
It creates additional exposure for damages against a party that engages in making inaccurate

filings. Idaho Code§ 30-21-211 provides:
LIABILITY FOR INACCURATE INFORMATION IN FILED
RECORD. If a record delivered to the secretary of state for filing under
this act and filed by the secretary of state contains inaccurate
information, a person that suffers a loss by reliance on the information
may recover damages for the loss from a person that signed the record
or caused another to sign it on the person's behalf and knew at the time
the record was signed that the information was inaccurate.
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Thus, where inaccurate filings impact a party Idaho law provides a legal remedy.
B. Defendants' Filings with the Secretary of State are Now Established to be
Inaccurate.
1. Defendants' Business Filings Show One Private Corporation Entity Involved in
the Provision of Care.
As the record shows, Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. filed its Articles of
Incorporation in 2009 31 • In 2015, Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. filed a d/b/a
identifying Valor Health as its operating name. 32 Nothing in either of those filings gives any
indication that Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. has a governmental nature.
To the contrary, the filings themselves presuppose the corporation's private nature
and thus Valor Health's private nature. For example, the Articles oflncorporation provide
the not for profit is comprised of members. 33 The filing is signed by an attorney in private
practice with the address of the Hawley Troxell law firm. 34 The Articles contain
indemnification provisions that are unnecessary to be included for any governmental entity
because of ITCA provisions. 35
The uncontested sworn testimony of record establishes that it is both proper and
sufficient for Idaho attorneys to rely on Idaho Secretary of State business filings to identify
the proper party defendants in litigation. 36 Plaintiffs' counsel appropriately relied on these

31

R. p. 210-13.

32

R. p. 215.
R. P. 2.
R. p. 213 .

33

34
35

Id.
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R. pp. 198-202, 263- 267 (Owens Aff.
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,r,r 3-4., Ruchti Aff ,r,r 1, 3., Wood Aff. ,r 3. Gresbeck Aff. ,r 3).

corporate filings in concluding that Valor Health is a d/b/a of an organized Idaho not for
profit subject to suit -- Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. The fact that it repeatedly
changed its registered agent--including a change filed the week before the malpractice at
issue in the case--reinforces the conclusion that Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. d/b/a
Valor Health was reasonably ascertained as the entity that provided the medical care at issue
and proper subject of this suit.
2. Defendants' Litigation Claims Assert that the Filings are Not Accurate and Valor
Health is Not a D/B/A of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc.
It is equally apparent within the case that Valor Health was advocated by the
Defendant and perceived by the district court as the county hospital. For example, in one
Affidavit, Bryan Elliot the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Gem County, swears
""Valor Health, also known as Walter Knox Memorial Hospital, is a state licensed hospital,
established and owned by Gem County. 37 " Similarly, the CEO of Valor Health claims Valor
Health is a D/B/A of Walter Knox Memorial Hospital. 38 But the reality is that the public was
informed otherwise through the business filings at the office of the Secretary of State.
The multiple consistent filings made by Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. of its
Annual Reports and changes of registered agents and d/b/as further establish the
reasonableness of Plaintiffs' reliance on the filings in determining against whom suit should
be filed. The change of registered agent days before the negligent care at issue in this case

37
38

R. p. 43, ,r. 1-2. (emphasis added); See also R. p. 134, ,r 2.
R. p.191.
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was the last filing made by Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc and the Secretary of State
now shows it as "Inactive-Dissolved (Administrative)."
C. Problems Created by the Corporate Filings With The Secretary Of State Inure to
the Detriment, Not the Benefit, of Defendants.
Defendants inaccurate filings mandate a reversal of the district court's decision and an
order allowing the case to proceed for a determination on its merits. The Idaho Legislature
has made clear that state law does not tolerate a party benefiting from contradictions between
its corporate filings and the positions it asserts in litigation. The law does not allow a party
to benefit from inaccurate filings. Although the statutory legal remedy is not adequate in this
case, the Court can apply equitable remedies so the case to proceed in a manner effect the
object of the statutes and promote justice.
1. The Statutory Legal Remedy Applies When It Provides Sufficient Basis for
Achieving A Just Outcome.
The legislatively adopted legal remedy for the inaccurate filings is contained in Idaho
Code § 30-21-211. It provides exposure for additional damages against a party that engages
in making inaccurate corporate filings. Although discussed with reference to a different
section number because it had been recently recodified, that statute was at issue in Gallagher

v. Best Western Cottontree Inn, et. al, 161 Idaho 542, 388 P.3d 57 (2017).
In that case, a plaintiff with a personal injury claim filed suit against a hotel company
the day before the statute of limitations ran. A new owner had purchased the hotel prior to
the injury. The new owner had not filed a new d/b/a with the Secretary of State. Based on

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF - 24

what was on file, the plaintiff attempted to serve a person authorized to accept service for the
previous owner. This was because the d/b/a on file still identified that entity as the owner.
Ultimately, well after the initial statute of limitations and period for service had passed,
plaintiff amended the complaint to name the new owner. The new owner filed a motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff asked the trial court to equitably toll the statute of limitations
due to the new owner's failure to file a replacement d/b/a. The trial court denied an equitable
remedy and dismissed the case. 161 Idaho at 543, 388 P.3d at 58.
On the facts of that case, this Court found that what is now Idaho Code§ 30-21-211
provided a sufficient legal remedy for the misled litigant and thus no equitable remedy was
necessary. The Court determined the law provided the misled litigant the ability to pursue
the business that failed to file the updated d/b/a for damages for "the lost opportunity for
recovery in the original case" as well as any other damages "proximately caused by the
defendant's breach of its statutory duty." Id. at 545, 388 P.3d at 60. On the facts before it,
the Court determined the statutory remedy was "adequate" and thus it refused to apply an
equitable remedy. See id., 388 P.3d at 60.
2. In This Case the Legal Remedy is Not Sufficient and An Equitable Remedy is
Needed to Achieve Adequate Justice.
The statutory remedy is not adequate under the facts of this case. Here, the statutory
remedy would create more problems than it solves. Application of either one of two
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potential equitable remedies, quasi-estoppel or equitable estoppel, is required for an adequate
remedy in this case.
Unlike Gallagher where there was a single business that failed to file with the
Secretary, here there are many, many people involved in misleading Plaintiff. A number of
Valor Health and Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. filings were made by employees
and agents of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. 39

Thus, should the Court agree with

Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. that Mr. Hollingsworth' s claim is barred by the
ITCA, then the statutory remedy in Gallagher results in far more complex litigation.
In the § 30-21-211 suit that would follow such a ruling, the scope and measure of
damages would be increased to include damages such as the direct costs of the initial motion
and this appeal. And, significantly, the number of relevant defendants skyrockets. The
statutory remedy held sufficient in Gallagher would have plaintiffs sue all the defendants
who filed false statements with the Idaho Secretary of State. Thus, personal litigation would
commence against various individual parties including attorney Brian Larson, current Valor
Health CEO Brad Turpen, former Valor Health CEOs Wade Johnson and Max Long, former
Valor Health CFOs Mary Lou Tate and Nathan Coburn along with Administrative Assistant
Wendy Quarve (and perhaps whomever her supervisor was).
Under this application of the statute, each of those individuals would be subject to
personal suit and personal liability for the damages caused to Mr. Hollingsworth. Such an

39

See R. p. 204, ~ 6 and pp .. 210-227. (showing signatures of various filers).
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outcome makes little sense from the perspective of a cost-effective resolution, judicial
economy or justice. Presumably many of those actors were merely following guidance, yet
the statute would impose liability upon them.
And given the factual differences between the multiple filings at issue here and the

Gallagher case, this Court should not limit the available remedies to the result in Gallagher.
That was a last-minute law suit with a single failure to update a d/b/a. This is a very timely
pursued claim with a multiplicity of inaccurate filings by many individuals on behalf of
defendant causing confusion. On the facts of this case, the statutory remedy is not
"adequate." Application of equitable principles is a better approach for the Court.
3. Quasi-Estoppel Precludes Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. From Claiming
Any Defenses Based on the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
Rather than massively adding to the cost and confusion of the litigation by limiting
plaintiffs to the statutory remedy, reasonable and appropriate equitable remedies are
available under Idaho law. The Court recently acknowledged that an equitable remedy might
be considered in an ITCA notice case but did not need to get there on the facts of that case.

See Cnw, LLC v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 Idaho 89,383 P.3d 1259 (2016). (not
considering equitable relief because notice sent to counsel for the entity was deemed
sufficient).
One applicable equitable remedy in this case lies in the doctrine of quasi-estoppel.
Idaho law recognizes the inequity of allowing an entity to assert a right to the detriment of
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another party when the entity has previously advanced a different position. See e.g., Twin

Falls Clinic Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22,644 P.2d 341,344 (1982)
( deciding Idaho law is that estoppel may act to prevent a party from asserting a statute of
limitations). The unconscionability of allowing Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc.
d/b/a Valor Health to claim protections of the ITCA after public filings served to hide a
claimed governmental nature invites the application of quasi-estoppel and an order allowing
the case to proceed.
It is worth noting at this point that the district court misapprehended plaintiffs

argument when it asserted there was an allegation "Valor Health intentionally filed false
documents with the [Secretary of State] to hide its true identity." 40 Plaintiffs have not
claimed that Defendants tried to create a problem. At no point have plaintiffs accused
defendants of making the filings for nefarious motives. To the contrary, as plaintiffs noted in
argument before the district court Defendant's motivations in its filings are not relevant to
the questions of should estoppel apply. 41 However, affirmance in this case could well
encourage another entity to engage in such false filings exactly to achieve the end of
avoiding a fair determination of liability.
This Court has taught that quasi-estoppel exists to prevent a party from changing its
legal position to reap an unconscionable advantage or impose an unconscionable

40
41

R. p. 298 . Cf Tr .. p. 16, LL. 3-6 (refuting the assertions of defendant that nefarious intent was alleged).
See generally Tr. p. 7(16), LL. 3-7.
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disadvantage on another. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038
(2003 ). The Court has explained the doctrine serves to prevent "a party from asserting to
another's disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by [it]." Eastern
Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402,410, 987 P.2d 314, 322 (1999). The

doctrine applies when "it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position
inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit." Id. Its
well-settled basis lies in the ideas of '"election, ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or
acceptance of benefits."' KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281 486 P.2d 992, 994 (1971)
(quoting Klontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 364-365, 399 P.2d 949, 954 (1965).)

The key to appropriate application of quasi-estoppel is that the entity against whom
the estoppel is sought to be enforced must have either ( 1) "gained some advantage to
[it]self," (2) "produced some disadvantage to another" or (3) the party asserting the "estoppel
must have been induced to change his position." Id.
The facts, construed as they must be in favor of the plaintiffs, establish in this case it
would be unconscionable to preclude this valid medical negligence claim.
Walter Knox Community Hospital Inc. chose to file as an Idaho business entity. It
later chose a commercial-sounding d/b/a of "Valor Health." Walter Knox Community
Hospital, Inc. also appointed a registered agent as required by Idaho law. The very role of an
agent is to accept the service of legal process. See Idaho Code § 31-21-401 et. seq.
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At all times and in all ways, Mr. Hollingsworth understood his medical care to have
been provided by Valor Health. He never received by way of billings, medical records or
other notifications any information to the contrary. Formal public filings confirmed his
understanding. Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. repeatedly and regularly reaffirmed
and ratified its existence as a separate and free-standing corporate entity by way of annual
filings and regular changes of its agent for service of process. Its articles of incorporation
create a clear inference that it is not a governmental entity. And, as discussed above, it is in
fact not a governmental entity under the ITCA.
Valor Health now claims that it is actually Walter Knox Memorial Hospital and as
such a county hospital. In this litigation it has been dismissive of the decade long series of
filings claiming the "paper corporation" was essentially meaningless. 42 At no point in the
litigation has it acknowledged the filing of Valor Health as a d/b/a of Walter Knox
Community Hospital, Inc. Defendant in its filings and arguments in fact rejects that it is a
d/b/a of Walter Knox Community Hospital, Inc. and the district court basically ignored this
central fact.
Defendants' position change to take advantage of the benefits of the ITCA notice
provision is wholly inappropriate. And, in light of the timely pursuit of his valid claim,
should not be allowed to negatively impact Mr. Hollingsworth.

42

See R. p. 191; p. 121-22.
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Mr. Hollingsworth was very prompt in identifying and pursuing what has been
determined to be a valid medical negligence claim. The CEO of Walter Knox Community
Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Valor Health was aware of the facts of the claim well within the tort
claim time limit of six months. 43 The corporation retained an attorney who was aware of the
claim within the time limit as well.
Moreover, Valor Health itself created a one-month delay in notices going out by
failing to respond to its patient's request for his medical records. It was not until 8 months
after the pre-litigation screening documents were provided to defendants, a decision that the
claim was meritorious had been reached, and suit had been filed, that Walter Knox
Community Hospital. Inc. asserted the ITCA as a defense to its employee's acts.
4. An Alternative Conclusion Is That Equitable Estoppel Precludes Walter Knox
Community Hospital Inc. From Asserting Any Defenses Based On The ITCA.
A second applicable equitable remedy arises from the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
As opposed to quasi-estoppel, equitable estoppel has the court evaluate the opposing party's
reliance on the estopped party's actions.
Under Idaho law equitable estoppel can preclude a defendant from asserting a time
limitation defense when the defendant does something that causes a plaintiff to miss a
deadline. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,663,201 P.3d 629,636 (2009). This
Court has explained the doctrine bars a defendant from "asserting the statute of limitations as
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a defense for a reasonable time after the party asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably
could have discovered the truth." Id. at 664, 21 P.3d at 637. See also Zumwalt v. Stephan,

Balleisen & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 825, 748 P.2d 406, 409 (Ct. App. 1987).
The doctrine has four elements:
[ 1)] there must be a false representation or concealment of a material
fact made with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; 2) the
party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth;
3) there was intent that the misrepresentation be relied upon; and 4) the
party asserting estoppel relied upon the misrepresentation or
concealment to his or her prejudice.

Sorenson v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr, Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 759, 118 P.3d 86,
91 (2005).
Valor Health now claims it is Gem County. Filings with the Secretary of State
nowhere indicate or even imply it is a Gem County entity, but rather indicate it is a d/b/a of a
private not for profit. If it is true as a matter oflaw Valor Health is in fact Gem County,
there is a clear misrepresentation in the filing of the erroneous d/b/a certificate with the
Secretary of State. Because the filings make those affirmative representations finding out a
different status is not reasonably discoverable. 44
Much like the adage "your lost keys are always in the last place you look for them"
when the answer as to who the defendant is has been found in the Secretary of State's
records one looks no further. Why would one look further when the answer has been found

44

See, e.g., R. p 264-65, , 3.
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at the legally reliable source? While there was argument made and adopted by the district
court below that plaintiffs could have or should have engaged in other informal inquiry rather
than search state records the questions would then arise: On what can a party rely? When is it
not enough to rely on mandatorily accurate legal filings? The district court indicated
plaintiffs' counsel was somehow required to investigate further. Practicing lawyers, as shown
without contradiction in the record, reasonably and appropriately rely on such filings. 45
No filing with the Idaho Secretary of State can be made without the intent it be relied
upon. The record establishes the plaintiffs actually relied upon the inaccurate filings in
pursuing the claim without a notice under the ITCA. Thus, the four elements of equitable
estoppel are present, and it is appropriately applied.
Therefore, equitable estoppel provides a basis for reversal of the district court's
decision on the motion for summary judgment.

VIII.

The Court Could Also Find That Sufficient Notice Was Provided
When The Pre-Litigation Claim Was Presented To The Valor
Health CEO And Its Attorney Of Record.
There is an additional manner in which the Court could choose to address the case

which would serve to rectify the law. The Court can reasonably find that sufficient notice
was in fact timely given.

45
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11 3-4., Ruchti Aff. ~1 1, 3., Wood Aff. ~ 3. Gresbeck Aff. 13).

A. The Notice Given Provides The Information Necessary To Fulfill The
Articulated Policy Purposes Of The ITCA
The record establishes that both the CEO of Valor Health and counsel for Valor
Health were fully informed of the claim at issue well within the statutory time frame for
notice. They received this notice by receipt of the plaintiffs' pre-litigation screening
materials from the Idaho State Board of Medicine ("ISBM"). The materials were signed by
counsel for the plaintiffs. 46 Such notice serves the purposes of the Act and should be
considered adequate. It is well-settled that the primary function of a tort claim notice is to
put the governmental entity on notice a claim is being pursued. Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274,
276, 647 P.2d 730, 732 (1980).
Medical cases where pre-litigation screening reviews are required are unique and
unlike other situations involving governmental entities. The material filed with the ISBM
and submitted to Valor Health is in the record at pages 255 to 262. That material identifies
the incident, the parties and the damages caused. This is more than enough information to
fulfill the purposes of the act of allowing the entity to make efforts to resolve the claim
amicably, understand the basis of the claim, and prepare its defenses. See Pounds v.
Denison, 120 Idaho 425 , 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991) (describing purported
purposes of Act).

46

R. p. 262.
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This issue was presented to the Idaho Court of Appeals in Foster v. Kootenai Med.

Center, 142 Idaho 425, 146 P.3d 691 (App. 2006) pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion to set
aside a judgment of dismissal. In that case, concluding Blass v. County of Twin Falls, 132
Idaho 451,974 P.2d 503 (1999) was dispositive, the Court of Appeals ruled notice sent to the
Hospital CEO via the Idaho State Board of Medicine was insufficient. Plaintiffs invite this
Court to visit this issue. A complete analysis will lead this Court to conclude the decision in

Foster was erroneously decided because it missed the unique scope of actual notice provided
in a pre-litigation screening filing.
B. Blass was Improperly Viewed as Controlling in Foster
When an entity receives actual notice from a claimant of a claim, a court-created rule
that imposes distinctions based on who delivers the notice or how its delivered does nothing
to promote the stated goals of the ITCA. The Court of Appeals' reliance on Blass to
conclude that a county owned hospital that receives notice of a tort-claim has somehow not
received sufficient notice was misplaced.
1. The Foster Case
In Foster, the plaintiff underwent prostate surgery at Kootenai Medical Center
("KMC") in October 2002. 142 Idaho at 427, 146 P .3d at 693. Two months later it was
discovered that the surgeon left a sponge in his pelvie cavity. One day after its presence was
discovered the following December, the sponge was surgically removed. In April 2003,
within the time limit for ITCA notice, Foster's counsel submitted a pre-litigation screening
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review application to the ISBM asserting Foster's claim against the physician and the KMC.
The ISBM, sent a copy of council's April correspondence to KMC as part of notifying the
hospital of the pre-litigation screening proceedings. KMC, the surgeon and Foster
participated in the ISBM pre-litigation screening which resulted in a meritorious finding.
Foster sued on the eve of his statute in October 2004. KMC responded by filing a
motion for summary judgment arguing Foster had failed to satisfy the notice requirements of
the ITCA. It contended Foster had submitted "no document" on his behalf regarding the
claim, and it made no mention of the April pre-litigation letter to ISBM. Jd., 146 P.3d at 693.
The district court granted the motion. It found Foster had never filed a formal notice
of claim with KMC. It further ruled plaintiff "relied solely upon the information that has
been generated by [ISBM] with respect to the request by the plaintiff of pre-litigation
screening pursuant to Idaho Code." Id., 146 P.3d at 693. The district court concluded the
ISBM's notice letter to KMC did not fulfill the requirements because notice needed '"to be
submitted in the form of a claim."' Id., 146 P.3d at 693.
It was only subsequent to the dismissal that Foster's counsel learned his April letter

had been forwarded to KMC by the ISBM within the tort claim notice time limits. Foster
then filed an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion seeking to have the court vacate the
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. Foster appealed. 142 Idaho at 428,
146 P.3d at 694.
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The Court of Appeals asserted Blass was controlling. 142 Idaho at 429, 146 P.3d at
695. It reasoned that because KMC received the April notice letter as a forward from ISBM
the letter could have no effect. The analysis it used arising out of Blass was that because
Foster had no special relationship with ISBM the fact it forwarded the actual notice letter to
the hospital was irrelevant. 142 Idaho at 429-30, 146 P.3d at 695-96. This conclusion that
actual notice is irrelevant and that there is some additional court imposed component that
requiring affirmative action by the injured party flips on its head this Court's recent
observation that it is necessary to "consistently take[] a liberal approach to interpreting the
notice requirement of the ITCA.' Cnw, LLC v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 161 Idaho 89,383
P.3d 1259 (2016) (citations omitted). Which is, of course, fully consistent with the
fundamental notion that cases should be decided on their merits not technicalities. See

County ofAda v. Bullen Bridge Co. , 5 Idaho 79, 88, 47 P. 818 (1896).
2. The Blass Case
In the case the Court of Appeals assessed as controlling, Blass suffered burns while in
surgery at the Twin Falls' county hospital. Blass, 132 Idaho at 451,974 P.2d at 503. The
hospital subsequently initiated contact with Blass offering to adjust his medical bill. All
Blass's later communication to the hospital, including his attorney' letter asserting hospital
negligence and referencing the pain and potential disabilities relating to the burn, went to the
hospital's insurance adjuster who sent them on to the hospital. Blass filed suit. The Court
granted summary judgment on the basis that Blass had failed to file a formal written notice of
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tort claim. Blass asserted he substantially complied with the notice requirements of the Act
when he submitted written communication of his damages to the hospital's insurance adjuster
who forwarded the communication to the hospital. This Court rejected the argument on the
basis that notice of the claim and injury provided through the governmental entity's insurance
company was insufficient. 132 Idaho at 453, 974 P.2d at 505.
In doing so the Court distinguished away an earlier precedent Smith v. City of

Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978). Its basis for distinguishing Smith was that the
insurer who provided notice to the City in Smith had a subrogation interest whereas the
insurer who sent notice to the hospital in Blass was the hospital's own carrier. This is
consistent with the formalistic approach imposed on litigants subsequent to Smith and
inconsistent with the Court's statements in Cnw.
In Smith, a driver was injured due to the City's failure to trim branches from in front
of a stop sign. The injured person's insurance carrier sent a letter to the City asserting its
right of subrogation. The Court found that although the contents of a letter written to the city
did not comply with all the notice requirements enumerated in the Act, the contents were
sufficient to also constitute notice of the motorist's personal tort claim against the city. 99
Idaho at 621, 586 P.2d at 1065.
The Smith Court reasoned:
the notice was not rendered invalid or insufficient simply because it
was made by Smith's subrogee rather than Smith himself. In our view a
contrary ruling would result in an unreasonably narrow and overtechnical construction of the last sentence ofl.C. § 6-907 and would be
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inconsistent with the basic intent and purpose of the statute, which is
the primary rule of statutory construction."

Id., 586 at 1065 (citing Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d 913 (1963)).
It is difficult to square the Court's approach shortly after the adoption of the ITCA in

Smith with some of the subsequent cases regarding notice.

C. Timely Notice to a County Hospital Via the ISBM Pre-Litigation
Process Meets the Requirements of the ITCA.
Without upsetting some of its intervening rulings, the Court can conclude that actual
notice signed by counsel for the plaintiff provided to the CEO of the corporate hospital and
its lawyer prior to the ITCA notice deadline is sufficient. "[A] contrary ruling would result
in an unreasonably narrow and over-technical construction" of the statute. In Foster the
Court reasoned the transmittal was merely "reliance on coincidental actions by a neutral third
party" and thus insufficient. 142 Idaho at 429, 146 P.3d at 695. This ignores that 100% of
the time the ISBM forwards the "application, claim and all documents" to "each named
Respondent. 47" That is uniquely in the pre-litigation process a potential plaintiff knows that
the claim will be forwarded to the claimed liable party.
Thus, the transmittal of the information of a claim in pre-litigation screening to the
defendant is not merely coincidental, it is expected. The ISBM serves a similar intermediate
role as would the postal service, Fed Ex, the telephone lines if faxed or any other
intermediary. Thus, this is unlike Blass where the alignment of the liability carrier, adjuster

47

R. p. 255.
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and hospital somehow precludes notice to the carrier from being notice to the entity. It is in
far closer alignment with Smith or Cnw in that the entity gets notice from the adverse party.
Thus, it is appropriate for this Court to find that a pre-litigation screening filing
transmitted to the defendant prior to the ITCA deadline in this case is in fact sufficient notice
for the purposes of the statute.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Based on repeated filings with the Idaho Secretary of State, Walter Knox Community
Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Valor Health and Harold Thompson MD were properly identified as the
defendants in the case. The decision to create a not for profit corporation and then use an
assumed business name for that corporation in the delivery of services certainly eliminates
any claim to protection under the ITCA.
Altemati vely, and perhaps more appropriately, equitable principles require allowing
the case to go forward. Or finally, the Court could determine that the notice to Valor Health
in this case via the ISBM fulfills the purposes of the ITCA and the case should go forward on
that basis.
Based on any of the above theories, the district court's grant of summary judgment
should be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings with direction to allow
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to name Walter Knox Memorial Hospital and for the case
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to proceed for determination on the merits.
Dated: January 30, 2020.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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foregoing using the ICourt E-File system which will send notification of such filing to:
Nicole L. Cannon
TOLMAN BRIZEE & CANNON, P.C.
132 3rd Avenue East
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1276
Email: ncannon@tbclaw.net
Dated: January 30, 2020.
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ADDENDUM A
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STATE OF IDAHO
Office of the secretary of state, Lawerence Denney
AMENDMENT TO CERTIFICATE OF ASSUMED
BUSINESS NAME
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For Office Use Only
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File# : 00037 14536

Idaho Secretary of State
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0080
(208) 334-2301
Filing Fee: $10.00 - Make Checks Payable to Secretary of State

Date Filed : 12/23/2019 11 :55:47 AM

The assumed business name currently on record is:

Select one: Standard, Expedited or Same Day Service (see
descriptions below)

Standard (filing fee $10)

Assumed Business Name

VALOR HEALTH

Date Filed

05/22/2015

The file number of this assumed business name on the records of
the Idaho Secretary of State is:

0000542197

(Jl
(Jl

The Assumed Business Name is amended to :

Change Assumed Business Name?

I do not want to change the name

The type of business is amended lo:

The general type of business transacted under the assumed
business name is:

Services

The mailing address for future correspondence is amended lo:

1202 E LOCUST ST
EMMETT, ID 83617-2715
The individual or entity names and business address(es) of those doing business under the ABN:
Name

Gem County

H

Address

tJ

415 E. MAIN
EMMETT, ID 83617

(f)
(D
()

1-1

Signature:

(D

Brade Turpen

12/23/2019

Sign Here

Date

rt
OJ

1-1
I-<;

Signer's Title : Chief Executive Officer
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